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AbstrAct
This paper focuses on the use of silver as 
a monetary standard in Mexico during 
approximately the last three decades of the 
nineteenth century and the first decade of 
the twentieth century. During this period, 
several events occurred in the market for 
silver that affected those countries attached 
to this metal. These events caused some 
of these countries to abandon silver for 
good and adopt other types of monetary 
arrangements. Mexico and a few others 
chose to stay with it.The reasons behind this 
decision are analyzed. Additionally, evidence 
that supports the theory of purchasing power 
parity between Mexico and the United States 
is also presented and analyzed.
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resumo
Este artigo enfoca o uso da prata como padrão 
monetário no México, durante aproximada-
mente as três últimas décadas do século XIX 
e primeira década do século XX. Durante 
esse período, vários eventos ocorreram no 
mercado de prata, que afetaram os países 
atrelados a este metal. Estes eventos causa-
ram alguns destes países a abandonar a prata 
para o bem e adotar outros tipos de regime 
monetário. México e alguns outros, preferiu 
ficar com ele. As razões desta decisão são 
analisados. Além disso prova, que apoia a 
teoria da paridade do poder de compra entre 
o México e os Estados Unidos são também 
apresentados e analisados.
Palavras-chave: México, padrão prata, 
teoria da paridade do poder de compra
final years of the silver standard in 
mexico: evidence of purchasing  
power parity with the united states
Antonio N. Bojanic*
Professor of Economics / CENTRUM – Pontificia Universidad Católica del Perú  
Urbanización – Los Alamos de Monterrico – Surco, Perú
* The author wishes to thank Leland Yeager for helpful comments. The author alone is 
responsible for any errors that remain. Ph. 1(703)475-7739 <abojanic@pucp.edu.pe>.
Submetido em maio 2011; aceito em julho, 2011.
|	 Antonio	N.	Bojanic
Introduction
In the 1870s, while most countries switched away from silver or 
bimetallism, Mexico and a few other nations remained on the silver 
standard. The reasons behind this decision are analyzed to determine 
what prompted these countries to stick with silver longer than most 
other nations. At the end of the day, the decision to stay with silver is 
found to be completely rational as some of these countries were 
producers of the metal, which justified clinging to it to support a 
significant domestic industry. Others simply enjoyed the benefits afforded 
by the continuous depreciation of silver1, which generated an artificial 
subsidy to their exports, produced a veiled protection to domestic 
industries competing with foreign goods, and might have also induced 
money illusion2 in certain groups of people. Mexico was both a 
traditional silver-producing nation and also experienced a significant 
export boom due, in part, to its adherence to silver, which made its 
products more competitive in the international markets. Mexico’s 
remaining with silver longer than most other countries seems to have 
made perfect sense while the benefits of its currency attached to the 
metal outweighed the costs of such association.
The depreciation of silver, which helps explain Mexico’s export 
boom between 1870 and the first decade of the new century, also had 
a significant impact on the economic relationship with the United States. 
As Kuntz (2000) demonstrates, in the 1870-79 decade, exports to the 
United States accounted for around 58 percent of total exports. In the 
next decades the share of exports to the US rose continually from 77 
percent (in the 1880s) to 82 percent (in the 1990s). By the turn of the 
1 India too remained with silver longer than most other countries, until 1893. In 
addition to having benefitted from the depreciating silver making its exports more 
competitive, this country was also a great consumer of the metal for cultural and 
historical reasons. As the Indian case illustrates, non-economic arguments also played 
a role in the decision to remain with silver.
2 Money illusion refers to a situation where people may have an illusory picture 
of their wealth and income based on nominal monetary terms rather than in real 
terms. A depreciating value of silver caused a depreciation of currencies attached to 
it. In those countries with currencies attached to silver, public servants and other 
economic agents receiving non-adjusted income or rents from government might 
have suffered from money illusion.
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new century, the share of exports to its neighbor to the north had 
increased to 83 percent and remained around this level well beyond 
1910. In terms of imports, the share of US imports to total imports into 
Mexico rose from 25 percent in the 1870s, to 46 percent in the 1880s, 
56 percent in the 1890s, and 64 percent in the 1900s. This ever-closer 
relationship with the United States is captured by purchasing-power-
parity3 estimations (PPP estimations)4. 
Although some may argue that PPP estimations do not by themselves 
prove anything new, as the close economic association between the US 
and Mexico is well known and has been extensively documented, it is 
remarkable that no formal testing of this hypothesis exists in the 
literature5 for the period of interest. Most works on the subject of the 
economic closeness between US and Mexico seem to assume that PPP 
holds without actually testing for it. In this work, this theory is formally 
analyzed to determine whether purchasing power parity holds for two 
countries with a well established relation that exceeds economic 
considerations.
As stated earlier, this paper analyzes the silver standard in Mexico 
during approximately the final decades of the nineteenth century and 
first decade of the twentieth century. In order to build the proper context, 
Section 2 analyzes the silver standard in Mexico. It starts by analyzing 
the export industries that were most benefitted by the depreciation of 
silver. It points out the great increase in exports that the country enjoyed 
while its currency depreciated, and it analyzes how this export industry 
changed during Diaz’s term as president. It also analyzes the evolution 
3 The theory of Purchasing Power Parity states that exchange rates between currencies 
are in equilibrium when their purchasing power is the same in each of the two 
countries. The basis for PPP is the “law of one price”: in the absence of transportation 
and other transaction costs, competitive markets will equalize the price of an identical 
good in two countries when the prices are expressed in the same currency.
4 While PPP is more likely to hold between trading partners, this is not necessarily 
always the case. Bojanic (2010) demonstrates that PPP held between Mexico and 
India during the latter part of the19th century and first years of the new century 
even though trade between these nations during that period of time is not known 
to have occurred. This author argues that these countries’ common relationship 
with silver is what contributed to PPP holding between them.
5 As far as I can tell, only Gomez-Galvarriato and Musacchio (2000) come close, but 
not quite, as they only test for the existence of a long-run association between the 
exchange rate Peso/$ and three different Mexican price indices.
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of imports into the country, particularly as it refers to the role that capital 
inputs played in the industrialization of Mexico during the 1870-1910 
period. Next, a brief account of Porfirio Diaz’s government is provided 
with special emphasis on the political accomplishments and failures of 
his government during the thirty four years as president of Mexico. 
Finally, some of the opinions that surfaced around 1905 are reported, 
when Mexico was preparing to leave the silver standard for good, as 
well as a description of the internal economic situation that finally led 
to the deposition of Díaz in 1911.
Section 3 presents purchasing-power-parity calculations between 
Mexico and the United States for the period 1886-1913. Other 
comparisons, such as differences in price fluctuations and the depreciation 
of the Mexican peso in step with silver, are also reported and analyzed. 
The results obtained are presented as evidence of the existence of 
purchasing power parity between the two countries. The calculations 
were done through the Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) Method, 
Cointegration Analysis, and with the help of graphs. As enunciated 
earlier, the importance and relevance of finding that PPP held with the 
United States rests on the fact that even back in the nineteenth century, 
Mexico’s main trading and economic partner was its neighbor to the 
North. The US was Mexico’s main export market and it was also the 
country’s most important provider of industrial inputs. The fall in the 
price of silver – and hence on the value of the peso – deepened the 
dependency with the United States. The export boom that began in the 
1890s and that was triggered by the depreciation of the peso was 
principally directed to the US market. Likewise, the rapid industrialization 
of the Mexican economy that occurred during the same period took 
place mainly with industrial inputs and technical assistance from the 
US. The formal testing of the existence of PPP between these two 
countries for the period 1886-1913 confirms the historically deep ties 
that have united these two countries for so long. 
Section 4 presents a summary of the most important findings of this 
work.
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1. The Silver Standard in Mexico
 A silver standard can be defined as a monetary standard under which 
the basic unit of currency is equal in value to and exchangeable for a 
specified amount of silver6. This standard was the prevalent monetary 
arrangement around the world for most of the nineteenth century. Silver, 
along with gold in the second half of the same century, were the two 
metals of choice for countries on a metal-backed standard. The ratio 
between the value of equal weights of silver and gold, which had been 
about 11 to 1 before the discovery of the Americas, when new discoveries 
of these metals occurred, rose gradually to about 15.5 to 1, where it 
remained until the latter part of that century. Since silver and gold were 
the metals of choice for countries with a metal standard, there were 
many attempts to establish a fixed value ratio between them for coinage 
purposes. Some authors argue that these attempts were never truly 
successful (LEAvENS, 1939), while more recently others have suggested 
that attempts at establishing a fixed value between the two metals were 
indeed successful for a long time, and that the demise of silver-backed 
standards was not a foregone conclusion (FLANDREAU, 2004).
Mexico was theoretically on a bimetallic standard since early in the 
sixteenth century with a coinage ratio of approximately 16 to 1 between 
silver and gold. Little gold was ever coined and none ever circulated, so 
Mexico was practically on a monometallic standard. Before the expansion 
of silver production in the United States in the 1870s, Mexico was the 
world’s largest producer of the metal. After 1870, the United States and 
Mexico were its two leading producers, so it is not surprising that the 
fall in the price of silver from 1873 to around 1910 profoundly affected 
the Mexican economy.
Before 1870, the market ratio between silver and gold fluctuated 
between 15.5 and 16 to 1 worldwide. The 16 to 1 coinage ratio was 
equivalent to a bullion parity, or US monetary value of silver, of $1.29 
per ounce. The bimetallism of France and other major European 
countries, as well as the monometallic standard of Germany, kept the 
6 This definition was adopted from the Gold Standard definition found in The 
American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language. The world “gold” was 
replaced in the text with the word silver.
|	 Antonio	N.	Bojanic10
silver/gold ratio and thus the exchange rates of silver-standard countries 
fairly stable; no exchange-rate problem was giving the silver countries 
a reason to switch standards. Mexico was quite comfortable with its 
silver standard and felt untouched by the seemingly harmless mild 
fluctuations of the silver-to-gold price ratio on the world market.
This situation changed shortly after 1870, as new forces affected the 
silver market. World silver production increased from about 25 million 
ounces in the 1840s to about 160 million in the 1890s (MITCHELL, 
1992). This increase in silver production was compounded in 1873 
when Germany abandoned the silver standard and adopted the gold 
standard. Germany’s dumping of silver in the world markets after 1873 
exerted even greater pressure on the price of silver, and during the 1870s 
it became evident that the old coinage ratio or bullion parity between 
the two metals was untenable. Like the rest of the world, Mexico began 
feeling the effects of silver’s depreciation during the 1870s.
This depreciation had great repercussions on the Mexican economy, 
especially since Mexico stuck to silver throughout the 1870s and well 
into the first decade of the twentieth century. As is often true in countries 
with devalued currencies, Mexico’s export trade was greatly stimulated, 
as were domestic industries producing substitutes for previously imported 
goods. The degree to which export industries were helped by a growing 
foreign demand for Mexican products and the ability of import-
substituting industries to satisfy domestic demand are, of course, issues 
crucial to understanding the real effects that the depreciation of silver 
had in Mexico.
The first part of this section focuses on Mexico’s foreign trade over 
roughly the period 1873 to around 1910. The second part analyzes the 
political climate and the role that Porfirio Díaz played during his 33-year 
term (1877-1911) as president of Mexico, with a brief interlude in the 
mid 1880s, when Díaz did not preside over the government. The final 
section analyzes Mexico’s internal economic situation and its possible 
connection to the revolution that finally deposed Díaz in 1911.
Foreign Trade
As stated earlier, until 1873 the price of silver was almost always 
above $1.29+ per ounce, corresponding to the US coinage ratio of 16 
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to 1 between silver and gold.  After 1873, the price of the metal declined 
for 20 years, until 1893, although in 1890, with passage of the Sherman 
Act7 in the United States, the price of silver rose for a brief period of 
time. Then it fluctuated around 60 cents per ounce, corresponding to a 
ratio of about 34 to 1. The depreciation of silver translated into a 
devaluation of the Mexican peso, which remained on the silver standard 
until 1905. Between 1873 and 1911 the price of the peso in New York 
fell from $1 to 49.8 cents. During the 1890s alone the peso sank 37 
percent against the dollar, from 75 to 47 cents. From 1900 until 1903 
the peso fluctuated around 47 cents, then falling to 40 cents, its lowest 
price until then. Adoption of the gold standard in 1905 stabilized the 
peso at 50 cents, a rate that changed little for the remainder of the period 
of interest (GOMEz-GALvARRIATO, 1999).
This brief history of the peso’s dollar value is important. Exchange 
rate fluctuations closely mirrored fluctuations in the price of silver. 
Furthermore, the continuing depreciation of silver and the peso, 
particularly before 1900, contributed to the great expansion of Mexico’s 
export industries by making Mexican products cheaper to foreign buyers. 
The depreciation in effect subsidized Mexican exports, since it outran 
any rise in Mexican prices and costs. Table 1 below reports disaggregated 
export figures for two points in time, 1877-78 and 191-118.
7 The Sherman Act of 1890 required the US Secretary of the Treasury to purchase 
monthly 4,500,000 ounces of silver at the market price to be paid for by the issue 
of treasury notes. In August 1893, the silver-purchase clauses of the Sherman Act 
of 1890 were repealed. It is widely believed that the Act was enacted in order to 
boost the price of silver.
8 Source for figures in tables 1 and 2 is Estadísticas Económicas del Porfiriato. 1. 
Comercio Exterior de México, 1877-1911, El Colegio de México (1960). Even 
though these trade figures have been updated and improved by the work of San-
dra Kuntz (2000, 2002, 2007, 2010), they are still quoted to emphasize general 
tendencies in the behavior of different groups of products. More detailed analysis 
of export and import trends is presented in Table 3, where the new trade series 
– constructed by Kuntz – are utilized. 
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Table 1 – Mexican Exports in 1877-78 and in 1910 -11
1877-78 1910-11
value % value %
Precious Metals  12.57  65.02  69.38  50.64 
Industrial Metals  0.05  0.25  17.62  12.86 
Agricultural Products  6.14  31.77  48.76  35.59 
Other Products  0.57  2.96  1.24  0.90 
 TOTAL 19.33  100.00  137.00  100.00 
Notes: Fiscal year beginning in July 1 and ending in June 30 of the following year All figures above 
are in nominal million of dollars, base year=1900-01
Source: Estadísticas Económicas del Porfiriato: Comercio Exterior de México, 1877-1911, El Colegio de 
México
As can be observed, the greatest increase i n exports occurred with 
industrial metals (copper and lead), which accounted for about 13 
percent of the total value of exports at the end of the fiscal year 1910-
11, up from a meager 0.25 percent in 18779. The share of agricultural 
products did not change much over this period, but their composition 
did: sisal hemp and rubber gained at the expense of more traditional 
agricultural products like precious woods. The share of other products, 
like cattle and coffee, fell two percentage points. The share of precious 
metals shrank considerably, although gold and silver remained the 
country’s two most important export goods.
Export expansion was triggered by the depreciation of silver, which 
made Mexican products cheaper in foreign markets as long as domestic 
prices and costs did not rise fully in step with the depreciating peso. 
This contribution to a favorable trade balance was offset by increased 
imports of capital goods for domestic industries. The latest production 
technologies were introduced, particularly in mining but also in other 
industries. In 1884, capital investment did not reach 57 million 1900-01 
dollars. By 1911 this figure had climbed to 1,619 million dollars, or 
around 29 times the capital investment of 1884 (BEATTY 2000). 
Increased exports and capital investment and their side effects, such as 
urbanization and industrialization, caused the import sector economy 
9 Kuntz (2007) shows that these industrial metals were mainly absorbed by the US 
and were utilized in this country’s process of industrialization, particularly in the 
vast expansion of urban centers throughout the nation. 
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to expand also. As Table 2 shows, imports expanded considerably, although 
not as much as exports. 
Table 2 – Mexican Imports in 1888-89 and in 1910-11
1888-89 1910-11
value % value %
Consumption Goods 19.33 52.80 43.76 43.04
perishable/unprocessed 0.90 2.47 7.81 7.68
perishable/processed 14.62 39.92 23.52 23.14
not perishable 3.81 10.40 12.43 12.22
Production Goods 17.29 47.20 57.90 56.96
unprocessed inputs 3.14 8.58 5.86 5.76
processed inputs 6.10 16.64 21.62 21.26
capital goods 8.05 21.98 30.43 29.93
TOTAL 36.62 100.00 101.67 100.00
Notes: Fiscal year beginning in July 1 and ending in June 30 of the following year All figures above 
are in nominal million of dollars, base year=1900-01
Source: Estadísticas Económicas del Porfiriato: Comercio Exterior de México, 1877-1911, El Colegio de México
The distribution of imports changed considerably. The share of 
production goods rose from 47.2 percent in 1888-89 to almost 57 
percent in 1910-11. The decrease in the share of consumption goods 
from about 53 to 43 percent suggests that Mexico’s import-substituting 
industries made great progress over the period as the prices of foreign 
goods rose due to a depreciating Mexican currency.
The decline in the share of consumption goods was mostly 
concentrated in perishable/processed goods – food, tobacco, clothing, 
and the like – as domestic industries producing similar goods developed. 
Nonperishable goods like jewelry were mostly bought by the higher 
economic classes: their share of total import value rose as Mexico became 
more prosperous. Perishable/unprocessed goods, or basic grains, also 
gained in import share as their domestic production lagged. 
The growth in imports of production goods accompanied the 
flourishing of import-substituting industries. Unprocessed inputs, like 
cotton, declined in import share as their domestic production grew. 
Processed inputs, like nails, were imported for use in the public works 
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and railroad expansion that were so extensive during Diaz’s administration. 
Furthermore, many of the companies, private and public, acquired 
machines and tools not available domestically. Imports of these capital 
goods rose quite considerably, their share rising from 22 percent of total 
imports in 1888-89 to around 30 percent in 1910-11. Williamson and 
Gomez-Galvarriato (2008) report that on a decade-by-decade basis 
between the years 1870 and 1900, Mexico’s imports of manufacturing 
capital imports grew at a faster rate than in other emerging Latin 
American nations (Argentina, Brazil and Chile), which confirms the 
comparatively more rapid industrialization that took place in Mexico during 
those years. This pattern in the behavior of capital imports was reversed 
during the period 1901-1911, as Mexico’s economic growth slowed down 
and the country prepared itself to adopt the gold standard.
A more detailed analysis of trade figures offers revealing patterns 
for the period under consideration. Table 3 below reports balances of 
trade in merchandises and in metals for each of the decades analyzed 
in this work10.
Table 3 – Balance of Trade by Decades, 1870-1910
 Decade Exports of 
Merchandises
Imports of 
Merchandises
Balance of Trade 
in Merchandises
Balance of trade 
in metals
1870-79 95,80 233,00 - 137,20 213,40
1880-89 179,30 357,00 - 177,70 250,70
1890-99 425,00 485,30 - 60,30 211,10
1900-10 1.000,20 1.053,70 - 53,50 208,60
Notes: Figures are nominal values and reflect millions of dollars
Source: Kuntz (2002)
As can be observed, the growth of merchandise exports between the 
1870s and the first decade of the 1900s is immense: over 940 percent. 
10 Table 3 utilizes the latest and most updated trade figures estimated in Kuntz (2002) 
paper. In addition to providing consistent estimates by comparing official statistics 
of Mexico and its main trading partners, Kuntz differentiates between commodity 
trade and specie movements, hence avoiding the problems of trade figures in other 
sources which group exports of metals without making a distinction between valid 
exports of minerals and specie payments – particularly in silver metal – for imports 
and other obligations.
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As stated earlier, this growth in exports is unsurprising due to a 
depreciating currency moving in tandem with a depreciating silver 
metal. It outpaces the growth in imports for the same period (over 350 
percent) by almost a factor of three. The 1880s and the first decade of 
the new century record the greatest growth in exports (104 and 118 
percent, respectively). The growth in imports is also greatest in those 
decades (77 percent in the 1880s and 57 percent in the 1900s), but at a 
significantly lower rates. In the four decades between 1870 and 1910, 
Mexico experienced continuous trade deficits that were financed by 
consistent surpluses of trade in metals and, as described by Márquez 
(2001) and Beatty (2000), by inflows of different types of foreign capital 
attracted by Mexico’s rapid industrialization process. 
It is interesting to note that despite Mexico’s substantial economic 
progress – reflected in its growing capacity to export a more diversified 
set of products – lingering social problems persisted, and as the new 
century arrived, these issues became more evident. The 1900s were not 
as kind to Mexico as the previous twenty years. Economic growth slowed 
down for several reasons. For one thing, the Mexican peso did not 
continue depreciating, stimulating exports, as it had done in the 1890s. 
Its value hovered around 47 US cents for the first couple of years, and 
then reached its lowest level ever, 40 cents, in 1903. In 1905 Mexico 
switched to a gold standard. This switch, instead of helping to alleviate 
the economic slowdown, contributed to the country’s problems in two 
ways. It caused rising internal prices for Mexican consumers, since these 
prices started catching up with the exchange depreciation of the silver 
peso, and the export industry was no longer subsidized by its currency 
being pegged to the value of a depreciating metal. Rising internal prices, 
a declining export industry, low domestic production of goods, and a 
general unhappiness among the populace, made the eventual transition 
to a new government inevitable. That is what the revolution of 1910 
finally accomplished.
Political climate under Porfirio Díaz
Throughout most of the eighteenth century, Mexico, like most 
countries in Latin America, was a fairly rudimentary economy. Detailed 
figures on growth of the economy, goods produced within the country, 
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wages, foreign trade figures and the like, are at best scattered. It is a fairly 
accepted fact, though, that the growth of the Mexican economy at the 
beginning of the eighteenth century was quite low. Foreign trade was 
almost completely concentrated on two countries, the United States 
and England, although other European countries had invested money 
in the country, some of it in the form of loans to the Mexican 
government. Following 1867 the country’s relations with other countries 
began to take on a new modern look. Mexico finally began to enjoy 
prosperity against a background of domestic peace. The government of 
Benito Juarez (1858-1872) is widely believed to have helped the 
formation of a stronger national government and a stronger awareness 
of the necessity to engage in trading relationships with a larger spectrum 
of countries. Juarez’s main concern was education, which he saw as the 
most important way to achieve true economic development. By the 
time Porfirio Díaz came to power in 1877, Mexico was well on its way 
to dismantling the feudal social, political, and economic system that had 
characterized his country for so long, though traces of such a system 
still exist today, as Haber (1995) ably illustrates on his work on Mexico’s 
industrialization process during the 1890-1940 period.
Díaz then took over a country that had already started a revolution 
of its own. His administration continued this revolution by further 
modernizing the country with public works, notably the construction 
of railroads, hospitals, and schools; and it began attracting foreign capital 
into Mexican export industries. Furthermore, Díaz eliminated the 
internal trade barriers that had inhibited the free flow of goods and 
services among the country’s different states. Thus, even though the 
dictatorship of Díaz ended abruptly in 1911, it is undeniable that his 
government pursued policies that paved the way for Mexico to become 
a modern and relatively prosperous country, at least during part of his 
time in office.
Even though great progress was made in several areas under Diaz’s 
rule, it did not extend to making the great masses of the people better 
off. Rather, economic differences between rich and poor widened, 
and this lack of progress among the great majority of people proved 
costly as the first decade of the twentieth century came to an end. 
Riguzzi (2009), in a lucid analysis of the political economy of the Diaz 
administration, assesses the arguments that link features of Porfirian 
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economic organization with the outbreak of the Mexican revolution 
in 191011.
The dictatorship of Porfirio Díaz subdivides into three periods: 
“Porfirismo”, “Porfiriato”, and “Porfiriazo”.  Porfirismo lasted from 
1877, when Díaz seized power, until about 1891. Promising change 
for the better, Díaz enjoyed mass appeal in this first period. Most parts 
of the country saw great development. The railroads were expanded 
to connect the main seaports, veracruz and Tampico, with internal 
centers of production, especially of agricultural goods. Cities along 
the US border were connected to Mexico City, benefitting intervening 
localities with new markets for their products. This period also brought 
unusual peace to a country where populist revolts had been the norm 
rather than the exception. One suggested reason for this lack of internal 
conflict is that Díaz restored religious liberty, previously much 
restricted. 
The second period, the “Porfiriato”, running from about 1891 to 
1904, was the one of greatest economic progress. It was also, 
coincidentally and key to the arguments of this paper, the period when 
the price of silver reached its lowest level. The country’s export 
industries really took off, and infrastructure, railways in particular, 
developed more than ever. The export industries, traditionally dominated 
by gold, silver, and other mining products, expanded to include goods 
like coffee, sisal hemp, copper, and varieties of precious wood12. The 
provision of essential services to the people lagged, however, while 
property rights and other institutions evolved in a way that, according 
to some authors (SCHETTINO, 2007), may have widened differences 
between rich and poor13.
11 In a closely related article, Musacchio, et al. (2008) show the negative impact of the 
Mexican revolution during the 1920s. Net company startups, in terms of capital, 
decreased as a result of the armed conflict, and never returned to the levels of the 
Porfirio Díaz era.
12 Passananti (2007) argues that during the early Porfiriato years Mexican officials 
deftly negotiated the pace and sequencing of the country’s reinsertion in the world 
economy. The government’s ability to exploit significant capital flows without 
undermining domestic support, helps explain the regime’s early economic growth 
and political resilience.
13 Catao (1998) argues that contrary to popular belief, Mexico’s unprecedented 
growth in exports during the 1877-1910 period, had little impact on key ma-
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The “Porfiriazo”, lasting from about 1904 to 1911, brought 
disenchantment among the masses that had first supported Díaz. 
Economic growth slowed, export industries stagnated, and a world 
financial crisis hit a vulnerable Mexico. During this first decade of the 
twentieth century, specifically in 1905, Mexico switched from silver to 
a gold standard to limit fluctuations of the peso’s exchange rate. The 
export industry, which had been subsidized by depreciation of the silver 
peso, was hit hard, as was the general population, which now had to 
cope with internal prices rising both in lagged consequence of silver’s 
earlier depreciation and in consequence of linkage to gold currencies 
now declining in purchasing power. 
In 1905, for the first time in several decades, the Mexican peso acquired 
a fixed exchange rate against the US dollar. In that year, also, the country 
began experiencing rising internal prices, a weakening of internal markets, 
and withdrawal of the subsidy to exports previously conferred by a 
depreciating silver peso. Such realities affected the government of Porfirio 
Díaz adversely in many ways, and in 1910 Mexico reverted to revolution. 
The masses that had once supported Díaz sent him into exile the following 
year14. Schell (1996), in addition to analyzing the influence of silver on 
the economic cycles during the Porfiriato, examines the impact of 
Mexico’s conversion to gold in 1905 and its subsequent contribution to 
the economic recession that preceded the revolution of 1910. Kemmerer 
(1940), in turn, offers a comprehensive analysis of the consequences of 
the revolution that finally deposed Díaz, with special emphasis on the 
monetary chaos generated during the 1912-1917 period.
Interestingly, most textbooks and commentators refer to the 33 years 
of Diaz’s dictatorship as the “Porfiriato”. They seem to associate him 
with the period of greatest progress during his presidency. They tend to 
forget the earlier and latter periods of Porfirismo and Porfiriazo. During 
the earlier one, the country was emerging onto the international scene 
with growing exports and a promising internal economy. During the 
croeconomic and sectoral indicators, giving credence to the opinions of authors 
like Schettino. 
14 Even though most authors argue that the crisis that finally deposed Díaz from power 
was mainly political, it can sensibly be argued that the economic hardships endured 
by most Mexicans due to the adoption of the gold standard played an even greater 
role in making the Díaz dictatorship untenable. 
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latter, Mexico reverted to the social, economic, and political backwardness 
that had characterized it for so long.
Internal Economic Conditions
The foreign sector had great impact on the internal workings of 
the Mexican economy. Prosperity in trade with other countries 
furthered the development of a market system at home. Regulations 
restricting the flow of goods inside Mexico were abolished, and various 
investments enhanced the productive sector. Railroad expansion was 
of special significance for domestic industries. Rail links helped trade 
among localities to flourish. Rail tracks grew from just a few hundred 
kilometers in the early 1880s to around 20,000 kilometers in 1911 
(COELLO et al. 1965).
Certain industries enjoyed dramatic development. The mining sector 
was the most dynamic. Production grew at about seven percent a year 
between 1877 and 1911. This growth was the direct result of foreign 
demand for Mexican metals, particularly silver and gold, but production 
of industrial metals like copper and lead also became quite important. 
Import-substituting industries flourished, growing at about five percent 
a year between 1877 and 1907. Most of the growth was concentrated 
in firms producing food and clothing, but firms producing chemicals 
and construction materials also benefitted. Agricultural production also 
grew, although technology did not advance much, high-intensity manual 
labor remaining the most important input in agriculture.
Of particular interest is the development of monetary instruments. 
Maurer (2002) details an interesting and provocative history of the 
banking system in Mexico, with special emphasis on the Porfirian 
economy and the necessary and mostly positive role that banks played 
in furthering the development of the economy during the Diaz’s 
administration. Among other things, he describes how the banking 
system was developed to meet the growing needs of domestic and foreign 
trade. In a related work, Ludlow and Marichal (1986) delineate the 
development of the banking sector in the country during the Porfirian 
years, emphasizing the relationship between economic and political 
influence. At any rate, the development of this industry was substantial 
during the period under consideration: in 1877 the medium of exchange 
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was composed solely of metallic coins. In 1880, with barter sill widely 
used throughout the country, coins in circulation barely surpassed 25 
million pesos, hardly enough to support the level of trade that the 
country would reach in later years. The growth in foreign trade and the 
advances in domestic markets forced Mexico to develop other 
instruments. At the beginning of the 1880s banknotes appeared, and by 
the 1890s banks were offering saving deposits to customers. By 1910, 
the amount of medium of exchange reached 310 million pesos, of which 
38 percent was coins, another 38 percent banknotes, and the rest deposits 
at private and public banks. Table 4 gives a breakdown of types of medium 
of exchange at five different dates.
Table 4 – Percentage Composition of the Medium of Exchange
Years Circulating 
Metal Coins
Circulating 
Currency 
Notes
Deposits Total
1877-78 100.00 0.00 0.00 100.00
1881-82 94.30 5.70 0.00 100.00
1894-95 65.60 34.30 0.10 100.00
1900-01 46.20 45.60 8.20 100.00
1910-11 38.00 37.60 24.40 100.00
Notes: Fiscal year beginning in July 1 and ending in June 30 of the following year
Source: Estadísticas Económicas del Porfiriato: Comercio Exterior de México, 1877-1911, El Colegio de México.
A final aspect of the Mexican economy worth analyzing is capital 
formation. Due to scarcity of domestic resources for meeting internal 
and export demands, Mexico, and more specifically the Díaz government, 
sought foreign capital goods for use in all productive areas. The industries 
that most benefitted from these capital goods were clearly those having 
most to offer foreign customers, so it comes as no surprise that the 
mining industry received the largest infusion of foreign capital goods.
Foreign capital helped Mexico in other important areas, as in the 
expansion of railroads and the development of electricity for public and 
private use. Most of the foreign capital came from the United States, 
especially after 1890, and from Great Britain. These two countries were 
Mexico’s main trading partners and so had a direct interest in the 
country’s economic development. Foreign capital also diversified into 
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many other sectors. It helped Mexico set up its banking system and, 
interestingly enough, helped finance the country’s public debt at various 
times. Even back in those days, Mexico’s internal markets were obviously 
luring the attention of foreign investors. One can only wonder what 
would have happened if the revolution of 1910 had never taken place 
and Porfirio Díaz had remained in power for another ten years. Perhaps 
the economic revolution that he started would then have yielded the 
results that most Mexicans wanted but apparently never received during 
the Porfiriato.
A topic of interest to economists and historians is the economic 
and political debates that took place in the country as it prepared to 
switch to a gold standard. In 1903, an editorial in The New York 
Times15quoted the Mexican minister of Finance, José Yves Limantour, 
defending Mexico´s silver standard and denying that Mexico was 
readying itself to abandon it in favor of gold. As the year 1905 
approached, however, there were many different opinions about what 
the Mexican currency should be. Some people favored the silver 
standard and wanted their currency to stay attached to the fluctuations 
in the price of this metal. Not surprisingly, those who wanted to 
stick with silver were those who had been favored by its depreciating 
value. Exporters and silver producers, who had directly benefitted 
from a devalued peso, were the most fervent supporters of a continued 
silver standard in the country. On the other hand, those groups that 
were importing goods were negatively affected by the higher prices 
paid for these goods and so were in favor of switching to a gold 
standard, which would stabilize fluctuations in the peso exchange 
rate. The government of Mexico was divided: on the one hand, its 
foreign debt and dividends to foreigners investing in the country 
had to be paid in gold prices, and so these payments had increased 
dramatically due to the depreciating peso. On the other hand, its 
export industry, and hence its export revenues, had greatly increased 
during this period thanks to the peso devaluation, which caused 
some people in the government to be in favor of staying with silver. 
This latter point of view is clearly reflected in the opinions of Matías 
 
15 New York Times, May 11, 1903.
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Romero, a government official during the Porfiriato: ‘Even though 
we have suffered the inconveniences of a silver standard, we are 
satisfied with it since its benefits greatly outweigh the costs we have 
had to pay’ (vILLEGAS, 1955). Those in favor of staying with silver 
based their argument solely on the fact that it was subsidizing 
Mexico’s export industry. Those opposed to silver were mostly 
concerned with the increase in Mexico’s foreign debt payments and 
the dividends the country had to pay to foreign investors. Barrera 
Lavalle, another government official, exposed the view of those 
opposed to the silver standard in these words: ‘Our balance of 
payments (in 1900-01) has a deficit of 13 million pesos due to 
increased payments on our foreign debt and increased payments of 
dividends to foreigners’ (vILLEGAS, 1955). He was one of the 
advocates of the gold standard and thought that a favorable balance 
of trade did not completely offset the increased payments that had 
to be made thanks to a depreciated peso.
At any rate, in 1905 Mexico switched to a gold standard and joined 
the community of gold-standard countries. This switch had its 
predicted effects: the export industry was no longer subsidized by a 
depreciating currency, and payments to foreigners were finally quoted 
in terms of the metal to which the Mexican currency was pegged. In 
defending Mexico’s switching to gold, Limantour – the same finance 
minister who two years earlier had denied any possibility of adopting 
the gold standard – in 1905 stated: ‘the silver standard helped only the 
export industry of the country. Its development though, never extended 
to other sectors of the economy; this made switching to a gold standard 
necessary’16.
16 Musacchio (2002) demonstrates that the decision to switch to gold was made before 
the creation of the Mexican Monetary Commission in 1903. He argues that the 
role of this Commission was not to consider the possibility of a switch to gold but 
rather to decide the best ways to adopt the gold standard. 
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2. Graphical Analysis and Purchasing Power Parity 
Estimations1
It has been noted that after 1870 the price of silver depreciated 
greatly in world markets, from a high of 60.56 pence per ounce 0.925 
fine in 1870, to a low of 24.06 pence in 1902. This decline in the value 
of silver was most evident after 1890, but its depreciation occurred 
throughout most of this 40-year period from 1870 to 1910. 
The depreciation in the price of silver was due to a number of reasons. 
As was discussed previously, during the 1870s many industrialized 
countries, most notably Germany in 1873, closed their mints to silver 
and switched to some form of gold-backed currency. The United States 
omitted the silver dollar from the Coinage Act of 1873, which paved 
the way for the gold standard because it left the privilege of free coinage 
to gold but took it away from silver. The US remained on its Civil War 
paper basis until specie payments resumed in 1879. The departure of 
countries like Germany and the US from the silver standard, along with 
other factors that had been previously analyzed, caused a continuous 
decline in the value of silver that lasted until 1890, when the Sherman 
Silver Purchase Act was enacted in the United States. This Act enabled 
the US Treasury to buy silver in the world markets to counteract the 
decline in the value of the metal, a decline that was having negative 
effects on certain sectors of the US economy, particularly the agricultural 
and silver-mining industries.
As can be observed in Figure 1, with the exception of the year 1890, 
when the value of an ounce of silver went up to 47.75 pence from a 
previous low of 42.69 pence in 1889, silver depreciated continuously, 
with the most acute depreciation taking place in the 1890s, when several 
international commissions18 established to deal with the world silver 
 
17 The Mexican Price index was taken from Gomez-Galvarriato & Musacchio, A. 
(2000). The exchange rate Pesos/$ was also taken from this article. The reader is 
advised to refer to this article for further information on the sources of the exchange 
rate. The US price index was taken from Warren & Pearson (1933).
18 Summaries of the conclusions from different appointed commissions established 
to deal with the silver question are found in the Royal Commission on Indian 
Currency and Finance, vol. 1, 1926.
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question failed to reach any credible agreements as to what should be 
done with respect to silver.
Figure 1 – Price of Silver and Exchange Rate $/Peso, 1870-1909
The departure of India from the silver standard in 1893 and the 
repeal of the Sherman Act the same year only made the decline in the 
value of silver more evident. After 1894 silver continued to depreciate, 
but at a slower rate, reaching a new level of 28.31 pence in 1900; 
thereafter it fluctuated in value until, in 1910, its price was 24.66 pence 
per ounce.
Mexico was on a silver standard throughout this period until it 
adopted the gold standard in 1905. As would be expected, the decline 
in the value of silver caused a depreciation of its currency. Since the 
United States finally went back to a gold standard in 1879 from its 
previously inconvertible greenback currency, its currency with respect 
to the Mexican currency appreciated in value after this year, and as can 
be observed in Figure 1, the dollar-per-peso exchange rate path followed 
a path very much like the one for the price of silver.
Like the price of silver, the depreciation of the peso after 1877 
proceeded gradually until 1890, when the Sherman Act was enacted in 
the US. In 1877, the average dollar-per-peso rate was 0.919, but by 1889 
it had gone down to 0.758. With the help of the Sherman Act the 
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exchange went back to 0.837 in 1890, but in 1891 it went back down 
to 0.743. The depreciation in the exchange rate then accelerated until 
1893, when India went off the silver standard and the Sherman Act was 
repealed. From then on, the peso depreciated more slowly. The rate was 
at 0.488 in 1900 and oscillated around this level until 1905, when Mexico 
finally adopted the gold standard and acquired a fixed exchange with 
the US dollar. In Figure 1, the year 1905 is the point at which the 
dollar-per-peso rate levels off and maintains itself constant until the end 
of the period of interest.
The basic differences between Mexico and the United States are 
apparent. While one, the United States, adopted the gold standard in 
1879, the other, Mexico, remained on the silver standard until 1905. 
Mexico’s currency depreciated greatly over this period, and this 
depreciation reflected wider fluctuations in the price level of the country. 
Figure 2 compares the price indexes for Mexico and the United States 
for the period 1886-1913.
Figure 2 – Price Indexes for Mexico and the US, 1886-1913
The price indexes in Figure 2 were converted to a common base 
month, March 1986. As indicated earlier, the price index of Mexico 
fluctuates substantially while the one for the United States shows a 
gradual decline until 1896, but thereafter it bounces back and a gradual 
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upward trend is observed for the rest of the period. What is noteworthy 
about Figure 2 is that after 1905 the price level in Mexico increased 
even more than before this year, when it adopted the gold standard. This 
development was due to the fact that by this time prices were increasing 
in gold-standard countries throughout the world, and Mexico, by 
switching to this standard, felt the same effects on its price level as did 
countries already on gold.
Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) calculations between Mexico and the 
United States for the period March 1886 through October 1913 were 
done through the OLS method and cointegration analysis. vector error 
correction estimates are also presented with the cointegration results.
The Mexican price index is a consumer price index and was 
constructed on the basis of 1930 prices; the basket of goods utilized to 
construct the price index was obtained through surveys made to workers 
of the Mexican Treasury Department and represent the most sophisticated 
work done in the area up until that time. The US price index is also a 
consumer index. The base month for both indexes were converted to 
March 1886, the beginning of the time series utilized here. The base 
month for the exchange rate Pesos/$ and the price ratio between the 
Mexican Index and the US Index were also converted to March 1886. 
Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) purchasing power parity (PPP) 
calculations between Mexico and the United States for the period March 
1886 – October 1913 are presented in Table 5.
Table 5 – OLS Regressions for the Peso/$ Exchange Rate and Log(Peso/$) Exchange 
Rate, 1886-1913
On P/P* On P, P* On Log(P/
P*)
On logP, 
LogP*
Intercept -0.091 2.016* 0.578* 0.591*
(-1.03) (16.79) (85.09) (2.27)
Price Ratio (P/P*) 1.901*
(22.92)
México Price Index (P) 0.018*
(19.91)
USA Price Index (P*) -0.020*
(-11.11)
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Table 5 – OLS Regressions for the Peso/$ Exchange Rate and Log(Peso/$) Exchange 
Rate, 1886-1913
Log (P/P*) 1.173*
(26.74)
Log (México Price Index) 1.173*
(25.71)
Log (USA Price Index) -1.176*
(-14.38)
# of Observations 332 332 332 332
R2 0.614 0.580 0.684 0.684
Adj. R2 0.613 0.577 0.683 0.682
Durbin-Watson Statistic 0.106 0.091 0.119 0.120
T-statistics are in parentheses
* Significant at standard levels of significance
The regressions were done with and without logs. The dependent 
variable in all regressions is the exchange rate in pesos per dollar19. In 
the first regression, the peso-per-dollar rate is regressed on the ratio 
between the Mexican and US price indexes. For this period, the 
regression coefficient of the price ratio is 1.901, significant at standard 
levels of significance20. This coefficient implies that the exchange rate 
is directly and positively associated with the price ratio of the two 
countries. When the exchange rate is regressed on the individual price 
indexes of the two countries, both coefficients have the correct signs 
and are significant at standard levels. Mexico’s price-index coefficient 
is positive, signifying that it directly affects the peso-per-dollar exchange 
rate, and the coefficient sign of the US price index is negative, supporting 
the theory that an increase in the price level in the United States would 
have a negative influence on the peso-per-dollar exchange rate.
19 This dependent variable is not to be confused with the variable graphed in Figure 
1, dollars per peso, the exact inverse of the variable used in the regressions.
20 As Froot and Rogoff (1995) demonstrate, the fact that this coefficient is not equal 
to 1 does not necessarily disprove the existence of PPP.
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When both of these regressions are done in log form, the results do 
not vary much from the previous regressions, although the coefficients 
for the individual price indexes of Mexico and the United States do 
become bigger in absolute value.
For the four regressions reported here, the Durbin-Watson statistics 
are quite low, indicating evidence of positive autocorrelation in the 
residuals. The estimators are unbiased, but they might be overstating the 
relationship that exists between the dependent and the independent 
variables. Computing the same regressions utilizing the first differences 
of all variables, computing a first-order autoregressive model (AR(1)) 
and/or including a time trend does not solve the problem of 
autocorrelation: the Durbin-Watson statistics do become a bit bigger 
but the t-statistics are meaningless; furthermore, some coefficients show 
the wrong signs. The regression results obtained when using the first 
differences of all the variables reflect the fact that the relation between 
the exchange rate and the price indexes is long-term in nature. That is, 
the economic association between the exchange rate and the price 
indexes is lost when using first differences: the R2 was almost zero with 
first differences in all regressions; the adjusted R2 was also near zero and 
in some cases, it was negative.
In order to overcome some of the limitations of the results obtained 
via OLS and to complement the general tendencies observed in Table 
5, Cointegration Analysis21 is carried out to confirm the existence of 
purchasing power parity between Mexico and United States for the 
period of interest. The results obtained with this technique are presented 
in Table 6, along with vector Error Correction estimates.
21 In their 2000 article, Gomez-Galvarriato, A., and Musacchio, A., carry out a coin-
tegration exercise between the exchange rate Peso/$ and three different Mexican 
price indexes constructed by them. One of these indexes is utilized here. The period 
they analyzed runs from 1888-1904. The difference and added contribution of 
this work lies in analyzing a longer period of time – including the time after 1905 
when a de facto, fixed exchange rate prevailed between the two countries – and 
in establishing a long-run equilibrium relationship (PPP relationship) between the 
exchange rate and the price ratio of the Mexican and US price indexes, which is 
proven to exist before and after 1905.
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Table 6 – Johansen Cointegration Tests and vEC Estimates, 1886-1913
Sample(adjusted): 1886:06 1913:10
Included observations: 329 after adjusting 
endpoints
Trend assumption: Quadratic deterministic trend
Series (in logs)1 : Peso per Dollar, Price Ratio México/US 
Lags interval (in first differences): 1 to 2
unrestricted cointegrAtion rAnk test
Hypothesized Trace 5 Percent 1 Percent
No. of CE(s) Eigenvalue Statistic Critical value Critical value
None * 0.05 18.19 18.17 23.46
At most 1 0.01 1.66 3.74 6.40
*(**) denotes rejection of the hypothesis at the 5%(1%) level
Trace test indicates 1 cointegrating equation(s) at the 5% level
Trace test indicates no cointegration at 1% level   
1The Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test for a unit root shows that both series are integrated of 
order 1 at standard levels of significance
Vector error correction estimAtes
Cointegration Equation Peso per 
Dollar
1.00
Standard errors in ()
t-statistics in [] Price 
Ratio 
Mex/US
-1.78
 (0.25)
[-7.04]
Constant -0.61
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The Trace Test indicates the existence of a cointegration equation22 
at the 5% level of significance between the exchange rate Peso per 
Dollar and the price ratio of the Mexican and US price indexes, both 
in log form. The vector Error Correction estimates23 show that there 
is a long-run equilibrium relationship between the exchange rate Peso/$ 
and the price ratio of Mexico and the US, confirming the existence 
of PPP between these two nations over the period of interest. 
Further confirmation of the results obtained through OLS and 
Cointegration Analysis is obtained when the exchange rate peso-per-
dollar is graphed with the price ratio between Mexico and the United 
States. Figure 3 shows this relationship.
Figure 3 – Exchange Rate and Price Ratio Mexico/US, 1886-1913
When the indexed peso-per-dollar exchange rate and the indexed 
price ratio between the price indexes of Mexico and the United States 
are compared in the same graph, the relation between these two variables 
22 A quadratic, deterministic trend was chosen to test cointegration between the 
variables as they seem to follow a path – exemplified in Figure 3 – consistent with 
this behavior. In spite of this, a cointegration equation was also found with a linear, 
deterministic trend.
23 The constant included in the vEC estimates captures market distortions created by 
trade barriers that were already in use during those years. Kuntz (2007) describes 
in detail the Mexican industrial policy of the period.
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is evident. When the same graph is done with the exchange rate and 
the price ratio not indexed to March 1886, the basic figure of the graph 
does not change. A positive relationship between the two variables is 
still highly visible, confirming that the results presented here offer 
evidence in favor of the PPP doctrine as it is applied to these countries 
for the period of time under study.
Figure 3, along with the results shown in Tables 5 and 6, are 
provided as evidence in support of the existence of purchasing power 
parity between Mexico and the United States, at least for the period 
1886-1913.
 
3. Conclusions
The price of silver fell from around 60 pence per ounce 0.925 
fine in 1870 to a low of about 24 pence in 1902, the lowest value 
silver reached during the period of interest, 1870 to around 1910. 
As a result of this depreciation, the Mexican peso depreciated while 
it was on the silver standard. The exchange rate in dollars per peso 
fell from a high of 0.919 in 1877 to a new level of around 0.488 in 
the early 1900s. In 1905, when Mexico left the silver standard, this 
rate had stabilized at 0.500 dollar per peso; this rate, at least until 
1910, never deviated much from this new level. The peso did attain 
a brief period of rising value in 1890, when the Sherman Act was 
enacted in the United States, but this appreciation did not last long, 
and by 1891 it was depreciating again.
The depreciation of the peso deepened the already closed economic 
association with the United States. It generated an export boom that 
was mainly directed to the US, and it allowed Mexico to begin its 
greatest period of industrialization with inputs and technical assistance 
from the US. Even though Mexican exports reached record levels while 
its currency was depreciating the most, it is also true that this depreciation 
translated into higher internal prices in Mexico.
Purchasing power calculations for Mexico and the United States 
offered strong evidence that, at least for the period March 1886 – 
October 1913, support the theory of purchasing-power parity (PPP). 
The exchange rate peso per dollar was regressed on the price ratio of 
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the individual price indexes of both countries. The same regressions 
were also done in log form. Consistently, all parameters showed the 
correct signs and were significant at standard levels of confidence. 
Cointegration analysis confirmed these results, showing the presence of 
a long-term relationship between the exchange rate and the price ratio 
of both countries. This relationship was also significant at standard levels 
of confidence. vector Error Correction estimates offered evidence that 
there is indeed a long-run equilibrium relation between the exchange 
rate Peso/$ and the price ratio of Mexico and the US. Finally, the 
exchange rate and the price ratio were graphed together. The graphical 
representation shows that the exchange rate and the price ratio followed 
each other very closely, further demonstrating that PPP seemed to hold 
for the period under consideration. 
The existence of PPP for the period analyzed confirms the very 
close association that has existed between Mexico and the United States 
for so long, relationship that seems to have deepened during the period 
analyzed, when the Mexican currency depreciated in step with the silver 
metal. The formal testing for the existence of PPP between these two 
countries captures the close ties that have united these nations for well 
over a century.
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